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Introduction 
ENVISIONING THE GOOD LIFE 
IN THE 21ST CENTURY AND BEYOND 
1 N MAY 201 4, cosmologist Stephen Hawking, computer scientist Stuart Russell, 
and physicists Max Tegmark and Frank Wilczek published an open letter in the 
UK news outlet The Independent, sounding the alarm about the grave risks to 
humanity posed by emerging technologies of artificial intelligence. They in-
vited readers to imagine these technologies "outsmarting financial markets, out-
inventing human researchers, out-manipulating human leaders, and developing 
weapons we cannot even understand."' The authors note that while the successful 
creation of artificial intelligence (AI) has the potential to bring "huge benefits" 
to our world, and would undoubtedly be "the biggest event in human history ... 
it might also be the last." Hawking echoed the warning later that year, telling the 
BBC that unrestricted AI development "could spell the end of the human race." 
While some AI enthusiasts dismiss such warnings as fearmongering hype, cele-
brated high-tech inventors Elon Musk, Steve Wozniak, Bill Gates, and thousands 
of AI and robotics researchers have joined the chorus of voices calling for wiser 
and more effective human oversight of these new technologies.• 
How worried should we be? More importantly: what should we do? 
AI is only one of many emerging technologies-from genome editing and 3D 
printing to a globally networked "Internet of Things" -shaping a future unpar-
alleled in human history in its promise and its peril. Are we up to the challenge 
this future presents? If not, how can we get there? How can htmlans hope to live 
well in a world made increasingly more complex and unpredictable by emerging 
technologies? Though it will require the remainder of the book to fully respond 
to that question, in essence my answer is this: we need to cultivate in ow-selves, 
collectively, a special kind of moral character, one that expresses what I will call 
the technomoral virtues. 
2. TE C HNOLOGY AND THE VIRTUES 
What do I mean by technom01"til virtue? To explain this concept will require 
introducing some ideas in moral philosophy, the study of ethics. At its most basic, 
ethics is about what the ancient Greek philosopher Socrates called the "good 
life": the kind oflife that is most worthy of a human being, the kind of life worth 
choosing from among all the different ways we might live. While there are many 
kinds of lives worth choosing, most of us would agree that there are also some 
kinds of lives not worth choosing, since we have better alternatives. For example, a 
life filled mostly with willful ignorance, cruelty, fear, pain, selfishness, and hatred 
might still have some value, but it would not be a kind of life worth choosing 
for ourselves or our loved ones, since there are far happier choices available to 
us-better and more virtuous ways that one can live, for ourselves and everyone 
around·us. But what does ethics or moral philosophy have to do with technology? 
In reality, human social practices, including our moral practices, have always 
been intertwined with our technologies.! Technological practices-everything 
from agriculture and masonry to markers and writing-have shaped the social, 
political, economic, and educational histories of human beings. Today, we depend 
upon global systems of electronic communication, digital computation, transpor-
tation, mass manufacturing, banking, agricultural production, and health care so 
heavily that most of us barely notice the extent to which our daily lives are tech-
nologically conditioned. Yet even our earliest ancestors used technology, from 
handaxes and spears to hammers and needles, and their tools shaped how they 
dealt with one another-how rhey divided their labor, shared their resources and 
living spaces, and managed their conflicts. Among our primate cousins, female 
chimpanzees have been observed to stop fights among males through technologi-
cal disarmament-repeatedly confiscating stones from an aggressor's hand. 4 
Ethics and technology are connected because technologies invite or afford 
specific patterns of thought, behavior, and valuing; they open up new possibili-
ties for human action and foreclose or obscure others. For example, the invention 
of the bow and arrow afforded us the possibility of killing an animal from a safe 
distance-or doing the same to a human rival, a new affordance that changed 
the social and moral landscape. Today's technologies open their own new social 
and moral possibilities for action. Indeed, hw11an technological activity has now 
begun to reshape the very planetary conditions that make life possible. Thus 2.1st 
century decisions about how to live well-that is, about ethics-are not simply 
moral choices. They are technomoral choices, for they depend on the evolving af-
fordances of the technological systems that we rely upon to support and mediate 
our lives in ways and ro degrees never before witnessed. 
While ethics has always been embedded in technological contexts, hwnans 
have, until very recently, been rhe primary authors of their moral choices, and the 
consequences of those choices were usually restricted to impacts on individual 
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or local group welfare. Today, however, our aggregated moral choices in tech-
nological contexts routinely impact the well-being of people on the other side 
of the planet, a staggering number of other species, and whole generations not 
yet born. Meanwhile it is increasingly less clear how much of the future moral 
labor of our species will be performed by human individuals. Driverless cars are 
already being programmed to make 'ethical' driving decisions on our behalf while 
we relax and daydream, even as other cars roll out of the factory programmed to 
commit the unethical act of cheating on their innocent owners' emissions tests.5 
High-frequency trading algorithms now direct the global flow of vital goods and 
wealth at speeds and scales no human observer can follow. Artificially intelligent 
life coach apps are here to 'nudge' us when we need to lower our voices, call our 
mothers, or write nicer emails to our employees. Advanced algorithms inscru-
table to human inspection increasingly do the work of labeling us as combatant 
or civilian, good loan risk or future deadbeat, likely or unlikely criminal, hireable 
or unhireable. 
For these reasons, a contemporary theory of ethics-that is, a theory of what 
cotmts as a good life for human beings-must include an explicit conception of 
how to live well with technologies, especially those which are still emerging and 
have yet to become settled, seamlessly embedded features of the human environ-
ment. Robotics and artificial intelligence, new social media and communications 
technologies, digital surveillance, and biomedical enhancement technologies are 
among those emerging innovations that will radically change the kinds of lives 
from which humans are able to choose in the 21st century and beyond. How can 
we choose wisely from the apparently endless options that emerging technologies 
offer? The choices we make will shape the future for our children, our societies, 
our species, and others who share our planet, in ways never before possible. Are 
we prepared to choose well? 
This question involves the future, but what it really asks about is our readi-
ness to make choices in the present. The 21st century is entering its adolescence, 
a time of great excitement, confusion, and intense anxiety, an age both wildly 
hopeful and deeply troubled. As with many adolescents, our era is also deeply 
self-absorbed. In popular and scholarly media, we find both historical conscious-
ness and the 'long view' of humanity giving way to an obsessive quest to define 
the distinctive identity of the present age, an identity almost always framed in 
technological terms. Whether we claim to be living in the 'Age of Information; 
the 'Mobile Era; the 'New Media Age; or the 'Robot Age; we seem to think that 
defining the technological essence of our era will allow us to better fathom the 
course of its future-ou,. future. 
Yet in one of those cruel paradoxes of adolescence, all our ruminations and 
fevered speculations about the mature shape of life in this century seem only to 
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make the picture more opaque and unsettled, like a stream bottom kicked up by 
shuffling feet. Among all the contingencies pondered by philosophers, scientists, 
novelists, and armchair futurists, the possibilities presented by emerging technol-
ogy have proved to be the most enticing to the imagination-and the most dif-
ficult to successfully predict. Of course, early visions of a postindustrial techno-
logical society were strikingly prescient in many respects. Debates about today's 
emerging technologies echo many of the utopian and dystopian motifs of 2.oth 
century science fiction: fears and hopes of a ' brave new world' ofbioengineered 
humans constructed by exquisite design rather than evolutionary chance; of 
humans working side-by-side with intelligent robotic caregivers, surgeons, and 
soldiers; of digitally-enabled 'Big Brothers' recording and analyzing our every act; 
and of the rise of a globally networked hive mind in the 'cloud' that radically 
transforms the nature of human communication, productivity, creativity, and 
sociality. 
Still, we cannot help but smile wistfully at the lacunae of even our most far-
seeing science fiction visionaries. In the classic Ray Bradbury tale 'The Veldt; 
first published in 1950, we encounter the existential and moral dilemma of the 
Hadley family, whose complete surrender to the technological comforts of the 
'Happy-life Home' has stripped their lives of labor, but also of joy, purpose, and 
filial love. In a present marked by the increasingly sophisticated design of'smart 
homes; Bradbury's story resonates still. It may have taken a few decades longer 
than he expected, but affluent modern families can now, just like the Hadleys, 
enjoy a home that anticipates their every personal preference for lighting, room 
temperature, music, and a perfectly brewed cup of coffee-and the 'smart homes' 
of the future will even more closely approximate Bradbury's vision. We also rec-
ognize all too well the Hadleys' parental anxiety and regret when their children, 
irretrievably spoiled by the virtual world of their inceractive playroom, fly into an 
incandescent rage at the thought of having their electronic anmsements removed. 
Yet coday we can only laugh or cry when Lydia, the children's mother, com-
plains that her surrender to domestic technology has left her without "enough to 
do;' and too much "time to think." No technologically-savvy 2.1st century parent 
can identify with Lydia Hadley's existential plight. 6 Rather, the promised land of 
unlimited technological leisure has given way to a reality of electronic overstim-
ulation and hypersaturation, a 2.4-hour ne'\vs cycle, and smanphones on which 
your boss texts you from the r 8th hole in Dubai while you sit at the dinner table 
wolfi ng down take-out, supervising your child's Web research on whale sharks, 
feverishly trying to get caught up on your email, responding to your Facebook 
invitations, and updating the spreadsheet figures your colleagues need for their 
afternoon presentation in Seoul. Leisure is one thing our age does not afford 
most modern technology consumers, who struggle each night to ignore the 
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incoming status updates on their bedside devices so that they may grab a few 
precious hours of sleep before rejoining that electronic day that knows neither 
dusk nor dawn. 
Indeed, the contemporary human situation is far more complicated, dynamic, 
and unstable than any of the worlds depicted in our first imaginings of a high-
tech future. Today, exponential leaps in technological prowess and productiv-
ity are coeval with widespread economic stagnation, terrestrial resource deple-
t ion, and rising ecological instability. A global information society enabled by a 
massive electronic communications network of unprecedented bandwidth and 
computing power has indeed emerged; but far from enabling a 'new world order' 
of a utopian or dystopian sort, the information age heralds an increasingly dis-
ordered geopolitics and widening fractures in the public commons. The rapid 
an1plification of consumerism by converging innovations and ever-shorter prod-
uct marketing cycles continues apace; yet far from ensuring the oft-predicted 
rise of technocratic states ruled by scientific experts, the relationship between 
science, governance, and public trust is increasingly contentious and unsettled.7 
Paradoxically, such tensions appear to be greatest where scientific and technical 
power have been most successfully consolidated and embedded into our way of 
life; consider that the nation that gave birth to Apple, Microsoft, Google, Intel, 
Amazon, and other tech behemoths has slashed federal funding for basic science 
research, struggled with declining scientific literacy and technical competence 
an1ong its population, and adopted increasingly ambivalent and politicized sci-
ence policy-even as it continues to shower the tech industry with tax loopholes 
and political access.8 
Such complexities remind us that predicting the general shape of tomorrow's 
innovations is not, in fact, our biggest challenge: far harder, and more significant, 
is ilie job of figuring out what we will do with these technologies once we have 
them, and what they will do with us. This cannot be done without attending to 
a host of interrelated political, cultural, economic, environn1ental, and historical 
factors that co-direct human innovation and practice. Indeed, a futurist's true 
aim is not to envision the technological future but our technosocial future- a 
future defined not by which gadgets we invent, but by how our evolving tech-
nological powers become embedded in co-evolving social practices, values, and 
institutions. Yet by tl1is standard, our present condition seems not only to defy 
confident predictions about where we are heading, but even to defy the construc-
tion of a coherent narrative about where exactly we are. Has the short history of 
digital culture been one of overall human improvement, or decline? On a devel-
opmental curve, are we approaching the next dizzying explosion of technosocial 
progress as some believe, or teetering on a precipice awaiting a calan1itous fall, as 
oiliers would have it?9 
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Should it matter whether our future can be envisioned with any degree of 
confidence? Of course we might want co know where we are and where we are 
heading, but humans characteristically want a lot of things, and not all of these 
are necessary or even objectively worthwhile. Could it be that our understand-
able adolescent curiosity about what awaits us in our century's adulthood is, in 
the grand scheme of things, unimportant to satisfy? Let us imagine for the sake 
of argument that given certain efforts, we could better predict the future shape 
of life in this century. Other than idle curiosity, what reason would we have to 
make such efforts? Why not just take the future as it comes? Why strain to see 
any better through the fog of technosocial contingencies presently obscuring our 
view? There is a simple answer. Om growing technosocial blindness, a condi-
tion that I will callttcute technosocial opacity, makes it increasingly difficult to 
identify, seek, and secure the ultimate goal of ethics-a life worth choosing; a life 
lived weLL. 
Ethics, defined broadly as reflective inquiry into the good life, is among the 
oldest, most universal, and cultmally significant intellectual preoccupations of 
human beings. Few would deny that humans have always and generally preferred 
co live well rather than badly, and have sought useful guidance in meeting this 
desire. Yet the phenomenon of acute technosocial opacity is a serious problem 
for ethics-and a relatively new one.'0 The founders of the most enduring classi-
cal traditions of ethics-Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Confucius, the Buddha-had 
the luxury of assuming that the practical conditions under which they and their 
cohorts lived would be, if not wholly static, at least relatively stable. While they 
knew that unprecedented political developments or natural calamities might at 
any time redefine the ethical landscape, the safest bet for a moral sage of premod-
ern times would be that he, his fellows, and their children would confront es-
sentially similar moral opportunities and challenges over the course of their lives. 
Without this modest degree of foresight, ethical norms would seem to have 
little if any power to guide our actions. For even a timeless and universally bind-
ing ethical principle presupposes that we can imagine how adopting that prin-
ciple today is likely to sustain or enrich the quality of our lives tomon·ow. Few are 
moved by an erhical norm or ideal until we have been able to envision its concrete 
expression in a future form of life that is possible for us, one that we recognize 
as relevantly similar to, but qualitatively better than, our current one. When our 
future is opaque, iris harder to envision the specific conditions of life we will face 
tomorrow chat can be improved by following an erhical principle or rule today, 
and such ideals may then fail co motivate us. 
While philosophical ethics first emerged in Greece and Asia in the 6th-4th 
centuries DCE, the need for ethical guidance as we face our future applies equally 
co modern sysrems of etl1ics. Yet modern ethical frameworks often provide ftwer 
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resources for mitigating the difficulty posed by an uncertain future than do clas-
sical traditions. For example, the ethical framework of x8th century German 
philosopher Immanuel Kant supplied a single moral principle, known as the cat-
egorical imperative, which is supposed to be able to resolve any ethical d ilemma. It 
simply asks a person to consider whether she could will the principle upon which 
she is about to act in her particular case to be universally obeyed by all ocher per-
sons in relevantly similar cases." If she can't will her own 'subjective' principle of 
action to function as a universal rule for everyone to follow, then her act is mor-
ally wrong. So if! cannot will a world in which everyone lies whenever it would 
spare them trouble, then it cannot be right for me to lie. 
Although it can be applied to any situation, the rule itself is highly abstract and 
general. It tells us nothing specific about the shape of moral life in x8th century 
Europe, nor that of any other time or place. At first we might think this makes the 
principle more useful to us today, since it is so broad that it can apply to any future 
scenario we might imagine. Yet this intuition is mistaken. Consider the dutiful 
Kantian today, who must ask herself whether she can will a future in which all 
our actions are recorded by pervasive surveillance tools, or a future where we all 
share om lives with social robots, or a future in which all humans use biomedi-
cal technology to radically transform their genes, minds, and bodies. How can 
any of these possible worlds be envisioned with enough clarity to inform a per-
son's will? To envision a world of pervasive and constant surveillance, you need 
to know what will be done with the recordings, who might control them, and how 
they would be accessed or shared. To know whether to will a future full of social 
robots, you would first need to know what r·oles such robots would play in om 
lives, and how they might transform hun1an interactions. To will a world where 
all hun1ans enhance their own bodies with technology, won't you first need to 
know which parts of ourselves we would enhance, in what ways, and what those 
changes would do to us in the long run, for example, whether we would end up 
improving or degrading our own ability to reason morally? Once even a fraction 
of the possible paths of technosocial development are considered, the practical 
uncertainties will swamp the cognitive powers of any Kantian agent, paralyzing 
her attempt to choose in a rational and universally consistent manner. 
Modern utilitarian ethics of the sort promoted by 19th-century British phi-
losophers Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill fares little better by telling us 
that we may secure the good life simply by choosing, among the available courses 
of action, that which promises the greatest happiness for all those affected. The 
problem of discerning which course of action promises the greatest overall hap-
piness or the least harm- among all the novel paths of biomedical, mechanical, 
and computational development open to us-is simply incalculable. The techno-
logical potentials are too opaque, and too many, to assign reliable probabilities 
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of specific outcomes. Moreover, technology often involves effects on humanity 
created by the aggregate choices of many groups and individuals. When we factor 
in the interaction effects between converging technologies, social practices, and 
institutions, the difficulty becomes intractable. 
In their book Unfit for the Futut·e, philosophers lngmar Persson and Julian 
Savulescu note that the technological and scientific advances of the 2.oth century 
have further destabilized the traditional moral calculus by granting humans an 
unprecedented power to bring about "Ultimate H arm:' namely, "making worth-
while life forever impossible on this planet."" We might destroy ourselves with a 
bioengineered virus for which we have no natural defenses. Carbon dioxide, ni-
trogen, and phosphorus from large-scale industry and agriculture may acidify our 
oceans and poison our waterways beyond repair. Or we might unleash a global 
nuclear holocaust, a risk that experts warn is once again on the rise.'J How can 
existential risks such as these, scenarios that would ruin any future possibility for 
happiness, possibly be factored into the calculation? 
Moreover, emerging technologies such as nanomedicine and geoengineering 
in theory have the potential to forestall 'Ultimate Harm' to humanity or to cause 
it; and not enough is known to reliably calculate the odds of either scenario. Add 
to this the fact that engineers and scientists are constantly envisioning new and 
untested avenues of technological development and the insolubility of the moral 
calculus becomes even more obvious. John Stuart Mill himself noted that the 
practicality of utilitarian ethics relies heavily upon our collective inheritance of 
centuries of accunmlated moral wisdom about how ro maximize utility in the 
knoUJn human environment.'~ Even on the timescale of our own lives, this envi-
ronment is increasingly unstable and unpredictable, and it is not clear how much 
of our accumulated wisdom still applies. 
Given this unprecedented degree of technosocial opacity, how can humans 
continue to do ethics in any serious and useful way? The question compels an 
answer; to abandon the philosophical project of ethics in the face of these condi-
tions would not only amplify the risk of' Ultimate Harm: it would violate a deep-
seated human impulse. Consider once again Ray Bradbury, whose stories are still 
among the most widely read and appreciated in the tradition of science fiction. 
What drives the imagination of a storyteller like Bradbury, and what makes his 
stories resonate with so many? Reading his most lauded works Fahrenheit 45I, 
The Mat·tian Chronicles, and the collection The 1/lu.stmtedMan (which leads with 
'The Veldt'), one notices how closely Bradbury's vision tracked human beings of a 
future Earth, or human descendants of Earth. W hy this anthropological fidelity 
in a writer hardly wanting for imaginative horsepower? 
Even the Martians in Bradbury's stories serve as literary foils who expose and 
reflect upon the distinctive powers, obsessions, and weaknesses of human beings. 
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And why is the human future usually envisioned on a time scale of fifty years, or a 
hundred and fifty? Why not a thousand years, or ten thousand? Why do so many 
of Bradbury's tales have a patently ethical arc, driven less by saintly heroes and dia-
bolical villains than by ordinary, flawed humans working out for themselves how 
well or how poorly their lives in an era defined by rockets, robots, and 'televisors' 
have gone? Here is one plausible answer: Bradbury seemed compelled to imag-
ine how human beings mor·e o~·less like himself, and those he cared about, would 
fare in the not so distant technological future-to envision the possibilities for us 
living well with emerging technologies, and more often, the possibilities for our 
foiling to live well. 
All of this is meant to suggest that the ethical dilemmas we face as liSt cen-
tury humans are not 'business as usual; and require a novel approach. Now, it is a 
common habit of many academics to roll their eyes at the fust hint of a suggestion 
that the human situation has entered some radically new phase. As a prophylactic 
against overwrought claims of this kind, these sober-minded individuals keep on 
hand an emergency intellectual toolkit {which perhaps should be labeled 'Break 
Glass In Case of Moral Panic') from which they can readily draw a litany of exam-
ples of any given assertion of transformative social change being tnunpeted just as 
loudly a century ago, or five, or ten. This impulse is often well-motivated: librar-
ies worldwide are stocked with dusty treatises by those who, either from a lack 
of historical perspective or an intemperate desire to sell books, falsely asserted 
some massive seismic shift in human history that supposedly warranted great 
cultural alarm. 
Yet sometimes things really do change in ways that we would be remiss to 
ignore, and which demand that we loosen up our scripted cultural patterns of 
response. At risk of inviting the scorn of the keepers of academic dispassion, I 
suggest that this is one of those times. The technologies that have emerged in the 
last half century have led to the unprecedented economic and physical interde-
pendence of nations and peoples and an equally unprecedented transmissibility 
of information, norms, ideas, and values. A great many intellectual and cultural 
scripts are being rewritten as a result-scripts about modern state power, about 
socioeconomic development, labor and human progress, and about our relation-
ship with our environment, to offer just a few examples. The conventional scripts 
of philosophical ethics must be rewritten as well. While an irreducible plural-
ity of ethical narratives is both inevitable and desirable in a world as culturally 
diverse as ours, we need a common framework in which these narratives can be 
situated if humans are going to be able to address these emerging problems of 
collective technosocial action wisely and well. This framework must facilitate not 
only a shared moral dialogue, but also a global commitment to the cultivation of 
the specific technomoral habits and virtues required to meet this challenge. 
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Fortunately for us, a tradition already exists in philosophy that can provide 
such a framework. That tradition is virtue ethics, a way of thinking about the good 
life as achievable through specific moral traits and capacities that humans can ac-
tively cultivate in themselves.'1 Part I of this book explains the distinctive advan-
tages of a virtue-driven approach to emerging technology ethics, and anticipates 
some of the challenges this project may face. Part II develops the th~oretical foun-
dations for our approach. Here we explore the rich conceptual resources of the 
classical virtue traditions of Aristotelian, Confucian, and Buddhist ethics, from 
which we construct a contemporary framework of technomoml vir·tues explicitly 
designed to foster human capacities for flourishingwith new technologies. Part III 
applies the framework to four domains of emerging technology (social media, 
surveillance, robotics, and biomedical enhancement technology) that are l ikely 
to reshape human existence in the next one hundred years, assuming that we are 
fortunate and prudent enough to make it to the 2.2.nd century. 
No ethical framework can cut through the general constraints of technoso-
cial opacity. The contingencies that obscure a clear vision of even the next few 
decades of technological and scientific development are simply far too numerous 
tO resolve-in fact, given accelerating physical, geopolitical, and cultural changes 
in our present environment, these contingencies and their obscuring effects are 
likely to multiply ratl1er than diminish. What this book offers is not an ethical 
solution to technosocial opacity, but an ethical strategy for cultivating the type of 
moral character that can aid us in coping, and even flourishing, under such chal-
lenging conditions. 
The framework developed in the following chapters adapts Aristotelian, 
Confucian, and Buddhist reflections on moral development and virtue to our 
need for a profile of technomoral virtues for 21st century life.'6 These will not 
be radically new traits of character, for they must remain consistent with the 
basic moral psychology of our species. Rather the technomoral virtues are new 
alignments of our existing moral capacities, adapted to a rapidly changing envi-
ronment that increasingly calls for collective moral wisdom on a global scale. In 
these challenging circumstances, the technomoral virtues offer the philosophical 
equivalent of a blind man's cane. While we face a future that remains cloaked 
in a technosocial fog, this need not mean that we go into it unprepared or ill-
equipped, especially when it comes to matters of ethical life. The technomoral 
virtues, cultivated through the practices and habi ts of moral self-cultivation that 
we can learn from the classical virtue traditions examined in this book, are hu-
manity's best chance to cope and even thrive in the midst of the great tmcertain-
ties and vicissitudes of technosociallife that lie ahead.'7 This hope will only be 
realized, however, if these virtues are more consciously cultivated in our fan1ilies, 
schools, and communities, supported and actively encouraged by our local and 
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global institutions, and exercised not only individually but together, in acts of col-
lective human wisdom. This is a tall order; but not beyond our capabilities. 
There is, however, what philosophers call a 'bootstrapping problem.' Our 
hope of flourishing in this and coming centuries-or even of securing our con-
tinued existence in the face of species-level threats created by our present lack of 
techno moral wisdom-requires us to act very soon to commit significant educa-
tional and cultural resources to the local and global cultivation of such wisdom. 
The fran1ework articulated in this book, which draws strength from multiple 
cultural sources, can help us accomplish just that. Yet our existing technomoral 
vices, along with the normal human range of cognitive biases and limitations, 
impede many of us from grasping the depth, scope, or immediacy of the threats 
to human flourishing now confronting us. Even among those who recognize the 
dangers, many fail to grasp that the solution must be an ethical one. We cannot 
lift ourselves out of the hole we are in simply by creating more and newer tech-
nologies, so long as these continue to be designed, marketed, distributed, and 
used by humans every bit as deficient in technomoral wisdom as the generations 
that used their vast new technological powers to dig the hole in the first place! 
While the first step out of the hole requires reallocating individual, local, and 
global resources to technomoral education and practice, we can and must make 
wise and creative use of technology to aid in the effort. Each of the emerging tech-
nologies explored in the book has the potential to be designed and used in ways 
that reinforce, rather than impede, our efforts to become wiser and more virtuous 
technological citizens. Thus our way out of the hole is a 1·ecursive procedme, in 
which traditional philosophical and educational techniques for cultivating virtue 
are used to generate the motivation to design and adopt new technological prac-
tices that shape our moral habits in more constructive ways. These in turn can re-
inforce our efforts of moral self-cultivation, forming a virtuous circle that makes 
us even more ethically discerning in technosocia1 contexts as a result of increasing 
moral practice in those domains. This growing moral expertise can enable the de-
velopment of still better, more ethical, and more sustainable technologies. Used 
as alternating and mutually reinforcing handholds, this interweaving of moral 
and technological expertise is a practical and powerful strategy for cultivating 
technomoral selves: human beings with the virtues needed to flourish together in 
the 21st century and beyond. 
The Motivation of the Book 
I was driven to write this book by a deep moral concern for the future of human 
character, one that arose over many years of watching my own moral and intel-
lectual habits, and those of my students, be gradually yet profoundly transformed 
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by ever new waves of emerging digital technology. Far from regarding my initial 
classroom forays into this ropic as silly technophobia, my students responded 
with overwhelming gratitude, even desperation, for a chance to talk about how 
their own happiness, health, security, and moral character were being shaped by 
their new technological habits in ways that often bypassed their understanding 
or conscious choice. 
These concerns will be familiar to readers of popular writing on digital cul-
ture. Nicholas Carr, Evgeny Morozov, and Jaron Lanier are just a few of the prom-
inent cultural critics who have recently expressed alarm at the possibility, even 
likelihood, that our mediatized digital culture is undermining core human values, 
capacities, and virtues. Carr's The Shall01vs warns us of deleterious cognitive and 
moral effects that our new digital consumption habits may be having on our 
brains. Morozov's The Net Delusion and To Save Everything, Click Here challenge 
our unreflective faith in technocratic 'solutionism.' From Lanier, a computer sci-
entist and pioneer innovator of virtual reality technology, came the widely read 
humanistic manifesto You At"e Not a Gadget, which laments the domination of 
contemporary technosocial life by the increasingly libertarian and antihumanis-
tic values celebrated by many Silicon Valley technologists: unrestrained capital-
ism, consumerism, and reductive efficiency. 
This book shares with these critics a deeply humanistic and explicitly mor-
alized conception of value. It assumes that the 'good life; by which we mean a 
human future worth seeking, choosing, building, and enjoying, must be a life 
lived by and with persons who have cult ivated some degree of ethical character. 
It assumes that this is the only kind of human life that is truly worth choosing, 
despite the perpetual challenges we encounter in build ing and sustaining such 
lives. It also holds that a good and choiceworrhy life has never been attained in 
any great measure by isolated individuals, but only by persons who were fortu-
nate enough to enjoy some degree of care, cooperation, and support from other 
hwnans, and who were highly motivated to give the same. This book is therefore 
fundamentally inconsistent with antihumanistic and neoliberal philosophies, 
and if Lanier is righ t, inconsistent with the philosophy of many of those driving 
the emerging technological developments it proposes to examine. 
Yet the reader will also find in this book a resolute hope for the future of 
human flourishing with, not without or in spite of. the technosocial innovations 
that will continue to shape and enrich our lives for as long as human culture en-
dures. As a scholar who chose out of all possible specialties the philosophy of 
science and technology, who as a young girl wrote adventure games in BASIC 
for her Commodore PET and eschewed the Barbie Oream'Vette in favor of Star 
Wars AT-AT and X-Wing toys, it is simply impossible for me to be antitechnol-
ogy, personally or philosophically. Indeed, to be antitechnology is in some sense 
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to be antihuman, for we are what we do and make, and humans have always engi-
neered our worlds as mirrors of our distinctive needs, desires, values, and beliefs. 
Of course we are not alone-increasingly, researchers find other intelligent ani-
mals such as birds, elephants, and cephalopods reshaping their environments and 
practices in surprisingly skillful and creative ways. Perhaps to be antitechnology 
is also to be antilife, or antisentience. But however widely we share this part of 
ourselves with other creatures, humanity without technology is not a desirable 
proposition-it is not even a meaningful one. The only meaningful questions 
are: which technologies shall we create, with what knowledge and designs, afford-
ing what, shared with whom, for whose benefit, and to what g-reater ends? These 
are the larger questions driving this book. Yet humans lacking the technomoral 
habits and virtues described within its pages could, I think, never hope to answer 
them. Let us not surrender that hope. 
